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I. INTRODUCTION
Because some degree of risk is inherent in the use of all drugs, an
individual nation's approach to prescription drug approval reflects that
nation's balancing of medical risks and benefits. The United States, for
example, has one of the most demanding prescription drug approval
regimens in the world.' Its complicated approval process reflects a con-
servative approach to health care for an extremely safety-conscious
market. American society has decided not to tolerate any more
thalidomide tragedies,2 even if that decision costs lives that unmarketed
1. See Teff, Drug Approval in England and the United States, 33 AM. J. CoMP. L. 567, 581
(1985). For an analysis of American prescription drug approval requirements, see infra notes 13-50
and accompanying text.
2. Thalidomide, a sedative frequently prescribed to pregnant women in the 1950s and early
1960s as an antidote to morning sickness, caused deformities in thousands of babies. The
925
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drugs could have saved.
Criticizing the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for delayed
market approval of promising drugs seems to have become fashionable,
but the FDA's conservative approach has suited societal wishes and the
tort liability system reasonably well.3 The conservative approach arose
in response to societal demands that, above all else, medical care must
be safe. When applied to drugs for the treatment of terminal diseases,
however, this conservative approval process deserves the criticism it has
engendered.4
With terminal diseases, a conservative approval policy can lead to
increased production costs, uncertain effectiveness, and, ultimately,
mortality.5 In the prevention and treatment of deadly and highly com-
municable diseases such as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), delay in drug introduction simply means that lives will be lost.
Because other countries approach the risk-benefit analysis of drugs less
conservatively,7 people desperately needing treatment will seek foreign
drugs. Thus, American society loses valuable monitoring and testing ex-
perience and protection for both society at large and people who lack
the resources and contacts to search worldwide for cures.' Finally, in
the case of fatal conditions, swift approval of promising treatments of-
fers valuable research insights with relatively small social or personal
costs.9
In the case of AIDS, at least, the FDA has not ignored these criti-
cisms. At several different levels, the FDA has made significant strides
thalidomide tragedy-and the idea that "safe" drugs could be so dangerous-gave rise to more
restrictive prescription drug approval procedures in many countries. See Teff, supra note 1, at 567.
Ironically, because thalidomide caused dramatic side effects in a relatively small class of patients,
the true defect may have resulted from a labeling, and not a testing, failure.
3. As a safety-conscious people, Americans traditionally have demanded safety in medicines.
See id. at 579-80.
4. This thesis is the focus of this Note. For a well-reasoned, contrary view, see Annas, Faith
(Healing), Hope and Charity at the FDA: The Politics of AIDS Drug Trials, 34 VILL. L. REV. 771
(1989).
5. See infra notes 91-132 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 51-90 and accompanying text; see also Teff, supra note 1; Note, Interna-
tional Trends in New Drug Approval Regulation: The Impact on Pharmaceutical Innovation, 10
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 317 (1984) (comparing American, British, Swedish, and Third
World approaches to regulation).
8. The FDA has made some strides in allowing importation of drugs approved in other coun-
tries, but still largely disallows use of drugs manufactured in the United States prior to FDA ap-
proval. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
9. This argument merely suggests that if patients have terminal diseases and medical science
has no proven cures, both have much to gain and little to lose by swift marketing approval of safe
drugs. But see Annas, supra note 4 (advocating uniform drug approval procedures); see also
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (discussing reasons why Congress wanted the
FDA drug approval system to apply to drugs for terminally ill patients).
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in the research and development of AIDS drugs.'0 Communication be-
tween research groups has improved, and the FDA has shortened treat-
ment-introduction delays.1 The FDA's response to AIDS, though, has
taken precious time. If a more research-friendly drug approval process
had been in place when AIDS first surfaced, valuable research could
have commenced more quickly and, perhaps, saved lives.
Given the unique nature of terminal diseases, the wisdom of the
FDA's conservative stance is questionable. For example, current FDA
procedures take a timid approach to human trials.'2 Moreover, the FDA
has not made a concerted effort to encourage drug production for the
victims of terminal diseases that are less visible than AIDS.
In Part II this Note surveys the prescription drug approval
processes of the United States and Great Britain. Historically, Great
Britain's prescription drug approval system has differed substantially
from the system in the United States. Examining the British approach
offers some suggestions for modifying and refining the current Ameri-
can system. Part III analyzes the criticisms and limitations of the cur-
rent American system in light of the experiences of the British system.
Part IV addresses a number of considerations peculiar to the treatment
of terminal diseases and urges that medicines for these diseases receive
special handling. Finally, Part V proposes modest changes in the cur-
rent drug approval approach that could offer real benefits in both pa-
tient care and societal protection.
II. A SURVEY OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG APPROVAL PROCESSES
A. The American System
Commentators have described the American prescription drug ap-
proval system as the most highly regulated system ever created to en-
sure a safe drug market.' 3 Before a sponsor may import, market, or
transport a drug in interstate commerce, the FDA must approve the
drug as being both safe and effective. 4 While emphasizing patient
10. See infra notes 146-58 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
12. In the present FDA system extensive toxicity tests and animal tests must occur before
human testing is allowed. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
13. R. Cooper, Remarks at Symposium for the 75th Anniversary of the 1906 Pure Food &
Drugs Act and the Meat Inspection Act, 37 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 49, 59 (1982) (describing the
American drug approval system as the "most detailed regulatory system for the protection of
human subjects the world has ever seen"); see also Roberts & Biggers, Regulatory Update: The
FDA Speeds Up Hope for the Desperately Ill and Dying, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 403, 403 (1989).
14. J. NIELSEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL DRUG LAW 14 (1986). Much debate has centered
around the exact meaning of "safe" and "effective." In United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544,
554-58 (1979), the Supreme Court interpreted these terms as unitary standards, with the same
meaning in all prescription-drug-related situations. For a recent administrative erosion of this hard
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safety, this approach both delays and limits new treatment options.15
These delays particularly affect victims of terminal'conditions.
Before the FDA grants its approval, a drug must pass a number of
preclinical hurdles, including extensive animal tests, to determine
whether the new drug is safe for use by human beings.'" In the case of
chronic-use drugs, for example, these requirements include twelve-
month chronic toxicity tests in two species." Although the FDA will
accept foreign data, typically it also demands data collected in the
United States, even in these preliminary tests.' 8 Not surprisingly, this
practice does not encourage rapid and efficient drug approval.
If the preclinical investigations and laboratory animal studies indi-
cate that the drug is reasonably safe for clinical trials and has potential
for treating a specific disease, the manufacturer may file a Notice of
Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug (IND) with the
FDA.19 The IND notice must contain, among other things, a description
of both the drug composition and manufacturing and quality control
methods, all information derived from preclinical investigations, state-
ments about the drug's history, including all relevant hazards, an out-
line of the proposed phases of further investigation, a statement
identifying an institutional review board with continuing reviewing au-
thority over the investigation, and an agreement by the sponsor to re-
port significant hazards and side effects. 0 Clinical studies on human
beings may commence thirty days after the FDA receives the IND
notice.21
Clinical trials in human beings generally occur in three phases. In
Phase I the drug sponsor introduces the drug into a small group of
healthy human volunteers for a short period of time.2 Although Phase I
testing focuses primarily on drug safety, the drug sponsor also evaluates
line approach, see infra subpart IV(A)(2). See generally Note, New Drug Approval: Lannett, The
Drug Lag, and the NDA System, 11 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 231 (1980).
15. For a discussion of drug delay in the American system, see infra notes 99-104 and accom-
panying text.
16. Note, supra note 7, at 323. "Preclinical tests" in this context simply means tests adminis-
tered before the clinical patient testing begins.
17. Dunning, Regulation, New Drug Development and the Question of Delay, 41 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 139, 139 (1986). For a discussion of the limitations of animal testing in general, see infra
notes 113-27 and accompanying text.
18. Dunning, supra note 17, at 139. The United Kingdom, by contrast, accepts studies per-
formed in other countries, provided that the studies appear legitimate. See id.
19. J. NIELSEN, supra note 14, at 14. As one step in shortening drug approval, the FDA pro-
posed the IND rewrite. For a discussion of its adoption and ramifications, see Roberts & Biggers,
supra note 13, at 424-25.
20. J. NIELSEN, supra note 14, at 14-15.
21. Id. at 15.
22. ABA AIDS COORDINATING COMMIrrEE, AIDS: THE LEGAL ISSUES 139 (1988) [hereinafter
ABA].
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other factors, such as rates of metabolism, absorption, and elimina-
tion.2 3 Apparently, the FDA uses this threshold testing to prevent toxic
compounds from reaching large groups of people.
The drug sponsor first administers the drug to symptomatic pa-
tients in Phase II testing.24 Phase II testing monitors drug safety in a
larger population than Phase I testing and provides an opportunity for
preliminary evaluations of efficacy.25 Drug sponsors still do not include
a large number of patients in these trials.26 Phase II testing is a crucial
part of the testing process because the results indicate whether the drug
has any real promise for treating the condition in question.
Phase III testing usually is the final test for safety and effective-
ness. In this phase the sponsor conducts at least two studies within a
relatively large population 27 to assess, among other things, optimum
dosage ranges, safety, and efficacy.28 If the drug is designed for terminal
diseases such as AIDS, the FDA generally has preferred to limit study
enrollment to several hundred people even though thousands may seek
to participate in these trials.29
Sometimes the FDA adds a fourth phase that more accurately re-
sembles postmarketing surveillance, not testing.30 During Phase IV, the
FDA can re-evaluate approval and demand either a recall or relabel-
ingA1 Because the FDA devotes little time and attention to this postap-
proval monitoring, 2 however, re-evaluation, recall, or relabeling are
unlikely.
Although the IND has many functions, its primary function is a-
lerting the FDA to the investigation so that the FDA can provide proce-
23. See id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (1990). This data aids in calculating the correct
dosage.
24. ABA, supra note 22, at 139.
25. Id.
26. Id. In fact, sponsors generally limit these trials to the smallest number of participants
necessary to obtain scientifically valid results. Comment, The Right of Privacy in Choosing Medi-
cal Treatment: Should Terminally Ill Persons Have Access to Drugs Not Yet Approved by the
Food and Drug Administration?, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 693, 700 (1987).
27. ABA, supra note 22, at 139.
28. J. NIELSEN, supra note 14, at 14.
29. ABA, supra note 22, at 139. For a proposal employing a parallel track, which allows pa-
tient access to "safe" drugs that are still undergoing testing for effectiveness, see Fauci Urges
"Parallel Track" Program: Critics Say ddI Trial Plan Isn't Working, 4 AIDS POL'Y & L., Nov. 29,
1989, at 1. For the participants, drug trials are much more than a disinterested scientific endeavor;
they can be a patient's only hope for treatment. For a more scientific and less individual perspec-
tive on drug trials, see Annas, supra note 4.
30. See ABA, supra note 22, at 141. Except in the case of special drugs for unique conditions,
the FDA rarely uses this fourth phase. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
31. ABA, supra note 22, at 142.
32. See id. at 140. Although this proposition is true historically, increased statutory require-
ments for postapproval testing may cause postmarketing surveillance to become a prominent part
of the approval process.
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dures that assure patient protection and a high-quality investigation.3 3
Thus, the FDA regards the IND more as a notice of investigation than
as an endorsement of the investigation. The FDA, however, monitors
the actual tests and requires testing institutions to establish review
boards,3 4 which ensure that technicians obtain proper consent and per-
form risk-benefit analyses for every patient.3 5 The ultimate FDA review
of INDs focuses on test design and the risk to test subjects. 6
For the sufferer of a fatal disease for which a drug sponsor is test-
ing a treatment, a less traditional option exists.3 Treatment IND allows
physicians to prescribe an experimental drug to a patient before all
clinical testing is complete.38 The Treatment IND concept enabled
AIDS sufferers to obtain Zidovudine (AZT) before formal FDA ap-
proval.39 Although this method depends on a sympathetic and knowl-
edgeable physician, Treatment IND circumvents many institutional
obstacles to drug availability.
After the sponsor successfully completes the IND procedure and
the data indicates that the drug is safe and effective for its intended
purpose, the sponsor may file a New Drug Application (NDA) with the
FDA.40 The NDA contains information about test results, chemical
composition, manufacturing methods, proposed labeling, safety, effec-
tiveness, and other relevant data.41 The NDA may consist of tens of
thousands of pages and include results from tests on thousands of
subjects. 42
After completion of the NDA, the FDA initiates review and, if nec-
essary, requests supplemental information. If the FDA deems the appli-
cation to be complete, the FDA has sixty days to file the application
and then one hundred eighty days to approve or disapprove it.43 After
33. J. NIELSEN, supra note 14, at 15.
34. Note, supra note 7, at 323.
35. Id. At least five experts qualified to review the test results must compose this review
board, although the board's main function is to protect patient welfare. Comment, supra note 26,
at 700.
36. Note, supra note 7, at 323.
37. See ABA, supra note 22, at 142.
38. Id. A Treatment IND may be used if: (1) the drug is intended to treat a serious or imme-
diately life threatening disease; (2) there is no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or ther-
apy; (3) the drug is under investigation in a clinical trial, or clinical trials have been completed;
and (4) the sponsor is diligently pursuing FDA approval. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b) (1988).
39. See ABA, supra note 22, at 143.
40. J. NIELSEN, supra note 14, at 15.
41. Id. at 15-16. In this sense, the NDA resembles the IND requirements addressed earlier.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
42. Note, supra note 7, at 323-24.
43. Peskoe, The New Drug Approval Process-Changes and Impacts, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 195, 195-96 (1986). Filing the drug application, in this case, simply means the FDA has ac-
knowledged receipt of the application and regards it as an application to be approved or denied.
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the FDA rules on the NDA, it issues an action letter: either an approval
letter giving permission to market, an approvable letter indicating that
the application is basically approvable, but deficient in some respect, or
a nonapproval letter indicating the need for significant amendment to
the application. 4 After receiving an approvable or nonapproval letter,
the applicant must respond within ten days; otherwise, the FDA can
consider the application withdrawn, further delaying the approval
process. 45
At this point an unsuccessful applicant either can amend the appli-
cation or ask for a notice of opportunity to be heard (NOOH).4 If the
sponsor amends the application, the FDA must act within forty-five
days.47 If the FDA issued a nonapproval letter, however, the FDA treats
the amendment as a "major amendment" and has one hundred eighty
days to review the amendment.48 An applicant choosing not to amend
also may request a NOOH.49 The FDA has sixty days to provide the
notice, although it may deny or postpone the hearing.50 If the FDA
grants a hearing, it still could find, of course, that the application is not
approvable.
B. The British System
The British drug approval system resembles the American ap-
proach more closely than any other nation's system. 51 For all the simi-
larities, however, the British approach is reputed to be more "objective"
and "expeditious" than the American system. 2 Like the American pro-
cedure, the British system begins with animal testing.53 The British sys-
tem, though, requires six-month chronic toxicity studies in two species
for chronic-use drugs. 5" American regulations also require testing in two
These time limits have no special significance in the particular context of this Note. That the FDA
can wait six months before requesting more information from the sponsor, however, seems absurd.
44. Id. at 196.
45. Id. at 197-98. Once an application is deemed withdrawn, to continue in the process, the
sponsor must resubmit the application. Then the FDA has 60 days to file and 180 days to approve
or disapprove the application. Id. at 195-96.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 198.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Note, supra note 7, at 324. The similarities include, for example, animal testing require-
ments, multiple phases of testing, and extensive safety testing.
52. Id.; see also infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text. See generally Teff, supra note 1,
at 572.
53. See Teff, supra note 1, at 576. For a general discussion on the limitations of animal
testing, see infra notes 113-27 and accompanying text.
54. Dunning, supra note 17, at 139.
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species, but for twice as long.55 Also, while the United States typically
requires domestic data, Great Britain will accept studies conducted in
other countries. 6
The Medicines Act of 1968 (Medicines Act), which became opera-
tional in 1971, is the primary mechanism for prescription drug regula-
tion in Great Britain. The Medicines Act establishes compulsory
licensing of drugs through a licensing authority composed of British
health ministers, including the Secretary of State for Social Services,
the Secretaries of State for Wales and Scotland, and the Department of
Health and Social Services for Northern Ireland.5 The Medicines Divi-
sion of the Department of Health and Social Services issues Clinical
Trial Certificates (CTCs), allowing drugs to be administered to human
beings and, later, Product Licenses (PLs), allowing drug marketing.59
These authorizations last for two and five years, respectively, after
which time regulations require renewal.60
The Committee on the Safety of Medicines (CSM), the organiza-
tion responsible for the safety, quality, and effectiveness of new com-
pounds, and the Committee on the Review of Medicines (CRM), the
organization responsible for drugs in use as of 1975, advise the
Medicines Division on drug approval issues.6 1 Although the Medicines
Division may issue a license without consulting the CSM, it must con-
sult the CSM before rejecting a PL.62 As in the American system, an
unsuccessful sponsor may appeal, in this case to the Medicines
Commission. 3
After approving the new drug for marketing, the CSM conducts
postmarketing surveillance through the "yellow card" system.6 4 When
patients report adverse reactions to prescription drugs, their doctors
complete and return postage-paid cards to the CSM 5 This system en-
55. See id. These requirements persist in spite of considerable evidence that trials lasting
longer than three months produce little new data. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
56. Dunning, supra note 17, at 139. Although the FDA claims to accept foreign data, it also
typically requires data collected in the United States. Therefore, as a practical matter, the British
system is much more willing to rely on foreign data. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
57. D. GREEN, MEDICINES IN THE MARKETPLACE 34 (1987).
58. Id.
59. Id. The American system, which requires that compounds be proven both "safe" and
"effective" before human use, generally does not distinguish between permission to administer
drugs and permission to market drugs. See generally J. NIELSEN, supra note 14, at 14.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 34-35.
62. Id. at 35.
63. Id. The Medicines Commission addresses these appeals and advises the Licensing Au-
thority. See id.
64. Id. The "yellow card" system is analogous to the Phase IV testing in the American sys-
tem described supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
65. D. GREEN, supra note 57, at 35. The present American system, by contrast, is not auto-
[Vol. 44:925
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ables the CSM to identify patterns of adverse reactions and take action,
such as advising the Licensing Authority to change the drug's data
sheet, issuing a warning letter, or revoking the drug's license.6 6
One fundamental difference between the American and British ap-
proaches is the British distinction between therapeutic and experimen-
tal drug use.6 7 Although in Britain investigational and experimental
drug use requires certification and licensing, therapeutic use by which
physicians administer drugs to their own patients is excluded from the
certification requirement.6 8 Although this practice resembles the Treat-
ment IND concept in the American scheme, the British system distin-
guished between experimental and therapeutic uses long before the
creation of the Treatment IND exception. 9 More importantly, the FDA
still demands stringent testing before drugs may be used for Treatment
IND. 70 Thus, although the FDA has made significant strides in mini-
mizing this difference, the Treatment IND concept does not match the
flexibility of the British system.
The British system is also fundamentally different in its reliance on
postmarketing surveillance, rather than more restrictive premarketing
approval as in the American system.7 1 The FDA attempts to discover
information relating to adverse drug reactions, effectiveness, and long-
term toxicity in premarketing screening.72 The British system, on the
other hand, relies on systematic, mandatory reporting of these aspects
of a drug.73 Although short-term testing may uncover most negative
side effects, only long-term experience with a large, widely varied popu-
lation will reveal the rare, and possibly more serious, reactions.7 4
Yet another significant difference between these two systems is the
use of apolitical committees to make approval decisions. Although the
FDA is moving toward increased committee involvement in certain as-
pects of the drug approval process, the agency only relies on advisory
committees occasionally.75 In Great Britain these committees are rou-
matic and is much less organized.
66. Id.
67. W. WARDELL & L. LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT 151 (1975).
68. Id.
69. The British Medicines Act of 1968 predates the Treatment IND exception, announced in
1987, by a significant amount. See supra notes 37-39, 57 and accompanying text.
70. The Treatment IND regulations require that the drug, at a minimum, undergo concur-
rent testing in clinical trials. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The British system im-
poses no testing requirements for therapeutic drug use. W. WARDELL & L. LASAGNA, supra note 67,
at 151.
71. Note, supra note 7, at 325.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Dunning, supra note 17, at 141. A number of different reasons support further use of
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tinely part of the approval process. 6 Furthermore, committee members
in Great Britain function largely independent of both government and
industry influence.77 This committee independence is in sharp contrast
to the FDA, which critics frequently charge is influenced by political
pressures.7 8
The differences between the two systems yield objectively demon-
strable results. Comparative studies show that in a specific period Great
Britain made similar new drugs available sooner than the United States
and approved many additional exclusive drugs.7 9 Eighty-two new drugs
became mutually available in both countries between 1962 and 1971.80
Fourteen appeared in both countries in the same year." Great Britain
introduced forty-three drugs first with a mean lead time of 2.8 years.82
Only twenty-five first appeared in the United States with a mean lead
time of 2.4 years.8 3 When viewed in terms of "drug years," the total
years of availability per drug, the statistics are even more startling: the
United States had fifty-nine prior drug years, but Great Britain had
one hundred twenty prior drug years of availability.84 Furthermore,
Great Britain had nearly four times as many exclusively available drugs
in the same time period as the United States. 85 More importantly, the
British have not suffered excessive new drug toxicity as a result of the
committees. The experience of multiple experts could assist in the approval process, and commit-
tees also limit the arbitrariness of individual decisionmakers. Because committees require a group
of people to reach a consensus, however, they can tend to stifle innovation.
76. Id.
77. REGULATING NEW DRUGS 235 (R. Landau ed. 1973). Critics have questioned the FDA's
independence from private industry for many years. As in other governmental areas, people with
expertise tend to flow in and out of the FDA. This revolving door raises serious concerns about the
independence of FDA employees. See D. GREEN, supra note 57, at 39 (noting arbitrary demands by
individual examiners); see also ABA, supra note 22, at 145 (discussing economic pressures on
clinical investigators).
78. See Note, supra note 7, at 324-25. See generally supra note 77. Even while working at
the FDA, employees' actions may be so self-serving as to interfere with agency objectives. See
Benac, FDA Officials Subpoenaed in Insider Trading Probe, The Tennessean, Apr. 4, 1991, at E4,
col. 4 (reporting that FDA officials have been subpoenaed in conjunction with an investigation of
stock trading based on confidential agency information).
79. REGULATING NEw DRUGS, supra note 77, at 240. The General Accounting Office of the
United States found that 13 of the 14 drugs that the FDA determined to be "important" drugs
between 1975 and 1978 became available in other industrialized countries between 2 months and
14 years before approval in the United States. See Roberts & Biggers, supra note 13, at 413.
80. W. WARDELL & L. LASAGNA, supra note 67, at 58-59.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. Besides introducing more drugs earlier, the British system apparently avoided intro-
ducing large numbers of dangerous or ineffective drugs. Roberts & Biggers, supra note 13, at 414.
In fact, one study found only 90 of the 369 "ineffective" drugs available in the United States
appeared in the British marketplace. Id.
85. W. WARDELL & L. LASAGNA, supra note 67, at 77.
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greater availability. 6
For all the benefits of the British regulatory system, it also has
costs. The average drug development time in Great Britain is approxi-
mately ten years.8 7 Moreover, critics have made allegations of overregu-
lation in Great Britain as well as in the United States.8 After passage
of the Medicines Act, for instance, drug development times increased
between twenty and three hundred percent, with a median of seventy-
five percent.8 Even so, academics generally consider the British system
to be less time consuming and less expensive than the American
process9 0
III. CRITICISMS OF THE CURRENT AMERICAN SYSTEM
The procedural safeguards in the FDA approval system enhance
the protection of the American public from dangerous drugs, but the
safeguards have a number of serious side effects, including the in-
creased monetary costs imposed by a sophisticated approval system.91
In an era of soaring medical insurance premiums, social program costs,
and federal budget deficits, the cost and distribution of health care
services have become major concerns. In addition, critics are concerned
that increased developmental costs will cause corporations to develop
fewer new drugs.2
A. Cost
In the United States, bringing a chemical compound from initial
synthesis to final marketing requires approximately thirteen years and
one hundred million dollars.9  At the outset, this capital-intensive pro-
cess eliminates small drug companies from the new drug development
field.9' The large multinational companies also bear great expense in
having to learn the intricacies of each market in which they operate in
86. REGULATING NEW DRUGS, supra note 77, at 240.
87. Teff, supra note 1, at 567 n.6.
88. Id. at 571.
89. D. GREEN, supra note 57, at 36.
90. See supra note 52 and sources cited therein.
91. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
93. Teff, supra note 1, at 567. Commentators frequently have suggested that the large cost is
primarily due to American regulatory requirements. See Note, supra note 7, at 321.
94. Roberts & Biggers, supra note 13, at 405. Even a slight delay in approval can reduce
greatly the net present value of a drug. In fact, a one-and-a-half-year reduction in new drug ap-
proval time can reduce the time necessary to recoup research and development expenditures by
five years. See id. at 405-06 n.13. Because research-oriented firms, such as small biotechnological
concerns, depend on an occasional superstar drug to recover research costs, delays in drug approval
affect these firms disproportionately. See id.
1991]
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order to reap the benefits of their new drug production. 5
Indeed, commentators and drug sponsors generally blame this as-
tronomical cost on the American regulatory requirements. To meet
these stringent requirements corporations use money allocated for re-
search and development to subsidize regulatory compliance efforts.9 7
Furthermore, compliance takes time, which in turn costs money; a one-
year delay in marketing can amount to as much as a ten million dollar
loss because of increased regulatory costs and lost sales.98
B. Delay
No one seriously disputes the fact that new drugs tend to reach the
market more slowly in the United States than in other sophisticated
drug-producing nations.9 Commentators have studied this gap in new
drug introduction between the United States and other developed,
drug-producing nations, also known as the "drug lag." 100 For example,
between the years 1962 and 1971, Great Britain had nearly four times
as many exclusively available drugs and twice as many drug years of
prior availability as the United States. 10'
Some commentators attribute this drug lag to medical "knowledge
depletion," a theory which suggests that scientists largely have ex-
ploited the major medical breakthroughs of the 1950s.102 According to
this view, further development will occur only when a new generation of
discoveries arrives.1 03 Because the drug lag is much more serious in the
United States than in other similar countries, however, "knowledge de-
pletion" must not be the only factor. Other reasons frequently offered
to explain the drug lag include errors in the pharmaceutical industry's
practices, lack of cooperation between the pharmaceutical industry and
95. See Note, supra note 7, at 331. For this reason and others, drug production has shifted
away from the United States. See generally Note, The Ethics and Economics of Unapproved New
Drug Export, 21 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 315, 334-36 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Unapproved
New Drug Export].
96. See Note, supra note 7, at 321; see also supra note 93.
97. See generally Roberts & Biggers, supra note 13, at 331.
98. See Note, supra note 7, at 321; see also supra note 94.
99. See, e.g., D. GREEN, supra note 57, at 39 (stating that the "hidden cost of product licens-
ing can be seen with particular clarity in America"); W. WARDELL & L. LASAGNA, supra note 67, at
77 (noting that "the United States has lagged considerably behind Britain" in new drug introduc-
tion); Teff, supra note 1, at 568 (noting criticisms of an "unnecessarily complex bureaucratic pro-
cess" and an "unduly adversarial stance toward the pharmaceutical industry"); Note, Unapproved
New Drug Export, supra note 95, at 334-39 (discussing extent and causes of the drug lag).
100. See Note, supra note 7, at 318; see also Note, Unapproved New Drug Export, supra
note 95, at 334. See generally Note, supra note 14.
101. W. WARDELL & L. LASAGNA, supra note 67, at 77.
102. See Note, supra note 7, at 319.
103. Id.
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the FDA, misdirected research, poor investigative data, and the FDA
requirement that both efficacy and safety be proven.104
C. Drug Development Discouraged
For all its benefits to domestic drug consumers, the FDA drug ap-
proval process also discourages new drug development. Indeed, one
commentator has noted that the price of a thorough drug approval
scheme that only allows the marketing of safe and effective drugs is
reflected in extremely high research and development costs; 10 5 these
costs correspondingly may diminish the potential for profit, causing de-
velopment to suffer. 08 Americans lose both the direct benefits of drugs
not developed and any unknown, hidden benefits.10 7 Frequently, drugs
produce unexpected, but eventually significant, benefits.108 Without ini-
tial development, these beneficial effects obviously never would appear.
Furthermore, the stringent regulatory climate in the United States
has led a number of American companies to transfer research and de-
velopment operations to foreign countries. 10 9 Other companies either
have established manufacturing and marketing affiliates outside the
United States or have acquired foreign firms to conduct research to cir-
cumvent FDA regulations. 10 Indeed, even if companies discover new
drugs through research conducted in the United States, the companies
still market approximately forty percent of these new drugs abroad
.first."' FDA requirements also have stifled new drug introductions
abroad. Because the FDA has protected consumers so effectively, other
104. Id. Not surprisingly, all of these explanations relate in some way to perceived deficien-
cies in the American prescription drug approval system.
105. Kenney, The Orphan Drug Act-Is It a Barrier to Innovation? Does It Create Unin-
tended Windfalls?, 43 FoOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 667, 667 (1988). One answer to this dilemma of devel-
opmental costs appears in the Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-ee (1988). By creating
financial incentives, the Act purports to facilitate development of drugs for rare diseases. See Ken-
ney, supra, at 667; see also Thomas, Re-Assessing the Orphan Drug Act, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBs. 413 (1990).
106. See note 105 and sources cited therein.
107. See D. GREEN, supra note 57, at 47.
108. Id. One example is the drug Zomax, originally prescribed as a general purpose analgesic
and an anti-inflammatory agent. After more thorough study, the drug appeared to have significant
use in prevention of coronary problems. Id. at 47-48. Other examples abound. Azathioprine, devel-
oped as an immunosuppressant, later found use as a treatment for rheumatoid arthritis and
chronic active hepatitis. Id. at 48. For a more thorough treatment of the hidden benefits of drugs,
see generally id. at 47-49.
109. Id. at 39; see also supra note 95 and accompanying text.
110. See Note, supra note 7, at 321-22.
111. Id. at 321. In the early 1960s American drug companies spent approximately 7% of their
research expenditures overseas and made approximately 20% of total sales abroad. Note, Unap-
proved New Drug Export, supra note 95, at 334-35. A 1984 Department of Commerce report
placed overseas research expenditures at 22% and foreign sales at 50% of the American total. Id.
at 335.
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countries regard FDA regulation as a benchmark and have emulated
the FDA scheme by enacting stricter premarketing approval standards
for new drugs.112
D. Questionable Efficacy of Animal Testing
One criticism frequently leveled at sophisticated prescription drug
approval schemes in general, and the American system in particular, is
that drug approval relies too heavily on the limited tool of animal stud-
ies.11 Both the American and the British systems require extensive
animal tests before approving human use. Some tests, such as drug me-
tabolism tests in animals, may provide useful data," 4 but because dif-
ferent species metabolize substances in different ways, animal tests
yield questionable data about the effects on human beings.1 5 In investi-
gating the effect of drugs on higher functions, such as the central ner-
vous system, animal-disease models provide particularly weak results."16
Also, animal models are almost useless in predicting adverse reactions
with other medications used by human beings.17
Indeed, animal studies often fail to reveal all the potentially signifi-
cant toxic effects of a drug in human beings."' Some drugs that have
potent side effects in human test subjects pose no problems in labora-
tory animals.I"9 One study of six chemically dissimilar drugs that had
been tested extensively in dogs, rats, and men showed that animal test-
ing failed to reveal more than fifty percent of the toxic effects in human
beings. 20 Study results also show that at least twenty percent of the
positive predictions for toxicity were false.' 2'
Thus, animal tests can be not only underinclusive but also overin-
clusive. For instance, a number of drugs used successfully to treat
human beings cause tumors or leukemias in animals. 22 In fact, Sir Al-
exander Fleming claimed that the penicillin project was successful be-
cause he never tested the drug in animals. 23 Had he known of
112. Note, supra note 7, at 322. Great Britain, Canada, West Germany, France, Sweden, and
Japan are among the nations developing drug approval systems rivaling the FDA procedures in
stringency. Id.
113. See generally REGULATING NEW DRUGS, supra note 77, at 40-46.
114. D. GREEN, supra note 57, at 41.
115. Id.
116. REGULATING NEW DRUGS, supra note 77, at 40.
117. Id. at 46.
118. D. JAYASURIYA, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LEGAL IS-
SUES AND APPROACHES 111 (1985).
119. REGULATING NEW DRUGS, supra note 77, at 40.
120. W. WARDELL & L. LASAGNA, supra note 67, at 138.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 63.
123. Id. at 138.
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penicillin's animal toxicity, Fleming said that he never would have tried
it on human subjects." 4 One commentator has observed that the loss of
even one drug such as penicillin because of excessively stringent animal
testing requirements would harm more people than all of the drug tox-
icity in the history of modern drug development. 12 5
Finally, animal testing presents another example of the FDA's
overzealous approach to premarketing testing. For example, the FDA
requires twelve-month studies of repeated-dose toxicity tests in ani-
mals. 126 Members of the European scientific community generally agree,
however, that these tests produce "few manifestations of toxicity after
three months and no significant findings after six months. '127
E. Improper Weighing of Risks and Benefits
Some degree of risk is inherent in the use of all drugs. Although the
FDA's conservative balancing has provided a number of benefits, it also
has had a large societal cost. Some critics suggest that by adopting a
more conservative approach to drug approval than did- Great Britain,
the United States lost more than it gained.2 If today's strict FDA ap-
proval process had been in effect earlier, some argue that the agency
would not have approved valuable drugs such as quinine, digitalis,
fluroxine, and even aspirin. 29
The current approval process can withhold drugs of undeniable
value from the marketplace. One estimate suggests that by eliminating
all drug-attendant risks, the average life expectancy of Americans
would increase by thirty-seven minutes.' Removal of all therapeuti-
cally effective medicines, on the other hand, theoretically would de-
crease American life expectancy by ten to twenty years.' 3 ' Even the
delay of effective medicines has extreme costs. If overly restrictive drug
approval processes had delayed streptomycin, para-amino salicylic acid,
and isoniazid by as little as two years, one estimate suggests that two
billion dollars and thirteen thousand lives would have been lost.1' 2 Al-
though new drugs necessarily present undesirable risks, withholding
drugs from the marketplace has attendant risks as well.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. D. GREEN, supra note 57, at 42.
127. Id. With the recognition that animals have rights and the rise in power of animal rights
groups, animal testing probably will face more difficult challenges.
128. See, e.g., W. WARDELL & L. LASAGNA, supra note 67, at 105.
129. See, e.g., D. GREEN, supra note 57, at 49.
130. Id. at 43.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 40. These drugs were used for the treatment of tuberculosis, among other things.
Id.; see also PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1898 (1991).
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IV. CORRECTIVE MEASURES
A. Government Responses
1. Congressional Legislation
Congress enacted the Orphan Drug Act (Act)1 " in 1983 to en-
courage the development of drugs for unique conditions.134 By provid-
ing strong economic incentives in the form of grants, tax credits, and a
period of monopoly, the Act motivates industry to develop and produce
drugs to treat rare diseases. 3 5 While the Act has been criticized for al-
legedly overcompensating pharmaceutical companies, 36 the FDA desig-
nated 239 drugs as orphan drugs in the first five years of the Act's
existence. 3 ' This program, of course, does nothing to make approval
quicker or easier, but it does provide incentives for producing new
drugs. Given the worldwide decline in drug development, 38 these incen-
tives seem warranted.
2. Food and Drug Administration Actions
a. Permanent Reforms
For all its overzealous adherence to procedure and administrative
inefficiency, the FDA has fistituted some changes to address the
problems of delayed drug approval. Facing mounting criticism, the FDA
published a report in 1982 outlining comprehensive proposals for
streamlining NDAs. 39 Known as the NDA rewrite, the proposals en-
compass a streamlined application format, a procedure for updating ap-
plications still under formal agency review, provisions for substituting
summaries for full-length case reports, an expedited appeals process, a
more liberal approach to accepting foreign data, and more thorough re-
porting of postmarketing problems.'40 At the time of the proposals, the
NDA system was fraught with problems; for example, an average appli-
133. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-ee (1988).
134. Kenney, supra note 105, at 667. See generally supra note 105 and sources cited therein.
135. The Act provides incentives in the form of grants, tax credits, and marketing exclusiv-
ity. Kenney, supra note 105, at 667 n.4.
136. Critics charge that some drug companies have reaped enormous benefits from this pro-
gram. See Thomas, supra note 105, at 431. For a business viewpoint from within the pharmaceuti-
cal industry, see O'Reilly, The Inside Story of the AIDS Drug, FORTUNE, Nov. 5, 1990, at 113. The
Act has suffered from confusion in the FDA interpretation of "drug" and questions about rewards
for simultaneous drug development. See generally Kenney, supra note 105; Thomas, supra note
105.
137. Kenney, supra note 105, at 667.
138. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
139. Teff, supra note 1, at 570 & n.21; see also supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
See generally Peskoe, supra note 43; Note, supra note 14.
140. Teff, supra note 1, at 570 & n.21.
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cation was one hundred thousand pages.14 1 Through the NDA rewrite
the FDA intended to decrease NDA length by seventy percent.142
In 1983 the FDA proposed injecting more flexibility into the IND
stage of the approval process.'43 These proposals attempted to provide
patients with serious conditions easier access to some investigational
drugs, to encourage reporting of adverse reactions, to exempt some
clinical investigations from IND requirements, and to strengthen com-
munications between drug researchers and the FDA.144 These reforms
promised much, but one could question their overall effectiveness.
Some observers have noted that the IND-NDA reform started los-
ing momentum by as early as mid-1983."45 Commentators attribute this
slowdown to a number of causes, including resistance to deregulation in
health and safety matters, a growing and influential generic drug indus-
try, generally diminishing enthusiasm for deregulation, and changing
agency practices.1 8 In any event, IND-NDA reform apparently has not
eliminated all unreasonable drug approval delays. 4 1
The FDA also has taken several steps designed to address the
problems of terminally ill patients. The FDA has created two centers
for AIDS research to provide direct access to AIDS-related information,
has developed a separate division to review AIDS treatments such as
antiviral drug products and drugs for opportunistic infections, and has
granted a top priority classification for proposed AIDS therapies to en-
sure that the FDA gives the highest priority to review of applications
for those therapies. 48 The FDA also developed the Treatment IND pro-
gram149 to provide patients access to drugs with demonstrated effective-
ness against AIDS-related diseases. In 1988 the FDA instituted a policy
allowing individual patients to import drugs from abroad. 50 Finally,
Congress has committed additional resources for staff and equipment to
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 570 & n.22; see also supra notes 19-36 and accompanying text.
144. Teff, supra note 1, at 570 & n.22. The final IND rewrite allows, among other things,
treatment use of investigational new drugs not yet approved by the FDA for sufferers of "serious
or immediately life-threatening diseases." Roberts & Biggers, supra note 13, at 425.
145. Teff, supra note 1, at 570.
146. Id. at 570-71. In spite of this slowdown, in the first year of the IND rewrite the FDA
approved marketing of seven experimental therapies. Thomas, supra note 105, at 422.
147. Teff, supra note 1, at 571. See generally supra note 43 and accompanying text.
148. Weissinger, Where Is the AIDS Problem Leading Us? A Forecast from the Center for
Drug Evaluation, 43 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 767, 767-68 (1988).
149. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
150. See Note, The FDA's Mail Import Policy: A Questionable Response to the AIDS Epi-
demic, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 169 (1990) (expressing a preference for Treatment IND
policies over mail import policies); see also Boffey, Importing AIDS Drugs: Analysis of F.D.A.
Policy, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1988, at C1, col. 4; Boffey, F.D.A. Will Allow Patients to Import
AIDS Medicines, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1988, at A15, col. 1.
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review drugs for AIDS treatment.151 Although these changes have pro-
duced positive results, 52 some observers note that the most important
outcome may be the increased interaction between the FDA, industry,
researchers, and academia." 3
b. Interim Measures
In 1988 the FDA once again moved to speed approval of promising
anti-AIDS drugs.," Although couched in language that conceivably en-
compassed other serious diseases, the proposal clearly resulted from
public demand for AIDS treatments. 155 These procedures, regarded as
temporary, interim procedures, allow marketing of promising drugs
without Phase III clinical trials.'56 The FDA claimed that deleting
Phase III clinical trials would reduce the human research time for new
drug approval from as long as ten years to as short as two years.1 57
The procedures, codified as "Drugs Intended to Treat Life Threat-
ening and Severely-Debilitating Illnesses," suggest that although the
FDA will apply safety and efficacy standards to all drugs, the variety of
both drugs and drug uses demands flexibility in applying standards.1 8
Initially, one must question the FDA's basic premise that the same
statutory standards should apply to all drugs, particularly drugs to
treat life-threatening and severely debilitating illnesses.159 In the same
paragraph the FDA explained that the procedures recognize that
greater risks or side effects are more tolerable from drugs to treat life-
threatening or severely debilitating illnesses than from drugs used to
treat less serious illnesses. 60 While the content and spirit of the FDA's
message are commendable, the dogmatic application of identical safety
and efficacy standards to all drugs severely undercuts the message."'
151. See Weissinger, supra note 148, at 768.
152. See id.; see also supra note 146.
153. See, e.g., Weissinger, supra note 148, at 768. See generally Norris, FDA's AIDS Pro-
gram, 12 NoVA L.J. 1103 (1988); Roberts & Biggers, supra note 13.
154. FDA Announces Interim Regulations to Speed Marketing of Promising Drugs, AIDS
POL'Y & L., Nov. 2, 1988, at 1 [hereinafter Interim Regulations]; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.80 (1990).
155. See Interim Regulations, supra note 154, at 1; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.80.
156. Interim Regulations, supra note 154, at 1; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.82(b).
157. Interim Regulations, supra note 154, at 1.
158. 21 C.F.R. § 312.80. The FDA modeled the new rule on the procedures developed during
the approval of Zidovudine (AZT). Used to treat AIDS, AZT appeared on the market after only 14
months of human testing. See Roberts & Biggers, supra note 13, at 436-37; Interim Regulations,
supra note 154, at 1.
159. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.80.
160. Id. The FDA stated: "These procedures reflect the recognition that ... patients are
generally willing to accept greater risks or side effects from products that treat life-threatening and
severely-debilitating illnesses, than they would accept from products that treat less serious ill-
nesses." Id.
161. But see Annas, supra note 4, at 789-96 (arguing that the type of condition should not
alter research methods).
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Although the FDA claimed that it will use "flexibility" when apply-
ing the standards, the claim is virtually meaningless because the FDA
has decided to apply objective standards. The FDA also has noted that
these procedures especially will apply if "no satisfactory alternative
therapy exists."1 2 Presumably, the FDA itself will determine whether
an alternative therapy is satisfactory. Although this idea has some
merit, it also provides an opportunity for the FDA to neglect conditions
that it deems unimportant.
The FDA has explained that the procedures factor into the serious
nature of the disease when evaluating the benefits of the drug.163 Be-
cause the agency will apply objective, black letter statutory perform-
ance and safety standards, however, even if applied flexibly, the FDA
clearly cannot evaluate the benefits of the drug in light of the severity
of the disease. Even if flexible application of these hard line tests were
possible, using an identical test for all drugs eliminates any possibility
of properly weighing risks against benefits. A risk-benefit analysis seems
appropriate under these circumstances, but it should be more
meaningful.
In the "scope" section of the life-threatening and severely debilitat-
ing illnesses protocol, the FDA encourages manufacturers to consult
with the "FDA on the applicability of these procedures to specific prod-
ucts.""64 Because the FDA has information regarding the drug's nature
and its intended use at this point, however, the FDA could conduct
these evaluations automatically and initiate the transfer of appropriate
drugs into this protocol. Similarly, the FDA suggested that sponsors of
appropriate drugs in the preliminary stages of drug development initi-
ate meetings with FDA officials to discuss both the proposed preclinical
and clinical studies.6 5 Why must the sponsor be required to request
such a meeting if the FDA values increased development of these drugs
so highly? At this point in development the FDA has enough informa-
tion to know whether the drug falls within these guidelines. Therefore,
automatically scheduling a meeting to resolve necessary matters before
preclinical and clinical tests begin seems sensible. Moreover, the FDA
stated that it will honor these requests to the extent that resources per-
mit.'6 6 Depending on the chosen interpretation, this statement either
means that the agency will conduct these meetings if at all possible, or
that the agency will conduct these meetings only if it deems that re-
162. 21 C.F.R. § 312.80.
163. Id.
164. Id. § 312.81(c).
165. Id. § 312.82.
166. Id.
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sources permit. If these drugs really do merit the highest priority as the
FDA has stated, resources always should permit.
In spite of the procedural hurdles, however, conducting meetings
early in the process to direct research and development and facilitate
ultimate approval is a positive step. These meetings can lead to a more
meaningful and satisfactory approval process for all parties. Addition-
ally, the FDA has increased reliance on outside, expert, and, hopefully,
independent committees.6 7 Under these procedures, which are similar
to those in the British system, 8 the FDA may invite participation from
outside expert scientific consultants.
The first round of these meetings, "[p]reinvestigational new drug
(IND) meetings,' 69 may occur before the submission of the initial
IND.170 At this meeting, the FDA and the sponsor will review proposals
and reach an agreement on the design of the animal studies that are
needed prior to human testing.' 7' The parties also may choose to dis-
cuss the scope and design of Phase I testing, as well as appropriate
standards. 1 2
The procedures for drugs designed for life-threatening ailments
also provide that, at the sponsor's request, the sponsor can meet with
the FDA at the end of Phase I clinical testing. 7 3 Once again, although
these Phase I meetings could help process the drug more quickly, they
are not automatic or mandatory. 74 Significantly, meeting at the conclu-
sion of Phase I facilitates design of appropriate Phase II trials, with an
aim toward eliminating the need for Phase III testing, which has been
criticized as unnecessary duplication. 75 This possibility is particularly
important for drugs designed to treat life-threatening diseases because
final testing for safety and effectiveness can be done with patients in
the general population as well as with patients in clinical trials. Be-
cause, by definition, terminal patients have little to lose and much to
gain, the approach seems eminently reasonable. 6 At the end of Phase
II testing, however, the FDA requires the same rigorous procedures as
for the end of Phase I meetings 17 and demands extensive documenta-
167. See id. §§ 312.82, 312.84(b) (1990).
168. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
169. Id. § 312.82(a) (emphasis omitted).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. § 312.82(b).
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. At least in theory, it seems that these patients have little to lose and much to gain. But
see United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554-59 (1979); Annas, supra note 4, at 777-78.
177. 21 C.F.R. § 312.82(b). These procedures include (1) submission of background informa-
tion for further testing at least one month in advance of the meeting, (2) submission of summaries
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tion. 7 8 Supposedly, a truly interested FDA would work toward ap-
proval, not just more procedure.
If the Phase II tests appear promising, the FDA may ask the manu-
facturer to submit a treatment protocol. 7 9 The FDA must "grant" the
treatment protocol; thus, the agency reserves the right to delay and,
quite possibly, deny approval.180 Whatever advantages this protocol
mechanism may have, it entails more delay in the drug's ultimate avail-
ability for patients. The FDA, however, seems to view the treatment
protocol as a stopgap measure for drug availability during the period in
which the sponsor assembles the marketing application and the FDA
completes review.181 Because the FDA intends these protocols to be a
temporary measure before ultimate approval or denial, a slight delay
may not be significant. With a more efficient and better organized ap-
proval process, however, treatment protocols would not be necessary.
Unfortunately, the FDA has attempted to correct a problem of over-
regulation with more regulation.
The FDA approval procedures for drugs to treat life-threatening
and severely debilitating illnesses emphasize the agency's use of a risk-
benefit analysis when assessing these drugs.182 Surprisingly, the agency
refuses to use this analysis for ordinary drug approval. Because all
drugs involve risk, an evaluation of risks and benefits seems necessary
for any meaningful drug approval. To require a risk-benefit analysis
only for a special class of drugs falsely implies that no risks exist with
the use of other drugs.
Furthermore, the FDA's proclamation that it will weigh the risks
and benefits of these drugs suggests quantitative and qualitative
problems. 8 First, assigning relative weights is highly subjective. In-
deed, given the personal nature of medical treatment, only a well-in-
formed patient can perform such weighing in a meaningful manner.
Only the patient truly can decide which negative side effects are per-
of investigation completed, (3) submission of plans for other nonclinical studies, and (4) labeling
proposals. See id. § 312.47(b)(1)(iv).
178. Id. § 312.82(b).
179. Id. § 312.83. The treatment protocol must contain (1) an explanation of the intended
use of the drug; (2) an explanation of the rationale for use of the drug; (3) a description of the
criteria for patient selection; (4) a description of the method of administration and dosages; and
(5) a description of clinical procedures, laboratory tests, and other measures to minimize risk and
monitor drug effects. Id. § 312.35(a)(1). Furthermore, the treatment protocol is to be supported by
a brochure to be supplied to each treating physician, technical information relevant to the safety
and effectiveness of the drug, and a commitment by the drug manufacturer to assure compliance
with the informed consent requirements of 21 C.F.R. Part 50. Id. § 312.35(a)(2).
180. See id. § 312.83.
181. See id.
182. Id. §§ 312.80, 312.84.
183. See id. § 312.84(a).
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missible in a given situation.8 Second, the FDA may undertake a bal-
ancing test, but because the risks are minor and the gains potentially
great with these particular drugs, the meaningfulness of balancing is
questionable. Indeed, a discussion of risks hardly makes sense to a ter-
minal patient. Given the nature of life-threatening illnesses, imagining
a scenario in which potential risks would outweigh potential benefits is
difficult. A reasonable patient who is interested in any form of treat-
ment probably will prefer not to try a promising new drug only if faced
with clearly toxic compounds.1 8 5
Instead of considering only the known risks of these drugs, the
FDA has indicated it also will evaluate potential risks."88 While nor-
mally this practice would constitute prudent policy, when individuals
only have a few months to live, potential risks should not weigh heavily
in the approval calculus. If the patient will die before the drug is mar-
keted, concerns at this stage of the approval process about possible
risks at some later date are frivolous.
After deciding the ultimate issue of approval, the FDA will issue an
action letter coming in one of the three forms used for other drugs.1 87 If
the FDA issues either a nonapproval letter or a letter of deficiency, the
agency will suggest how to correct deficiencies and provide any advisory
committee recommendations regarding the application.1 88 This proce-
dure is a sound step by the FDA to expedite new drug availability. Also,
providing committee input to help applications become approvable il-
lustrates the potential of committees to improve the prescription drug
approval process.
The new procedures for drugs to treat life-threatening and severely
debilitating illnesses, unfortunately, do not carry the same enabling at-
titude into the question of proper time frame. The FDA has stated that
the procedures and requirements of 21 C.F.R. sections 314 and 600189
184. Balancing patient rights with their implied autonomy and the desire to avoid unortho-
dox, and sometimes dangerous, medical treatments, has proved troublesome. In a well-reasoned
and thought-provoking dissent, Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California Supreme Court argued
that the constitutional right to privacy extends to a patient's choice of medical treatment. People
v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 711, 591 P.2d 919, 927, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 439 (Bird, C.J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979). Concerned that patients could be forced to have or forego treat-
ments and that orthodoxy has inhibited, not encouraged, the development of new treatment alter-
natives, Chief Justice Bird supported recognizing and preserving both the patient's and the
physician's rights in this context. See id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
185. See generally United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
186. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.84(a) (1990). But see Roberts & Biggers, supra note 13, at 437
(suggesting that problems exist with limiting premarketing testing).
187. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.84(c); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
188. 21 C.F.R. § 312.84(c).
189. See id. §§ 314, 600.
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govern these exceptions from standard procedures. 190 In other words,
the FDA applies the same reviewing time frames to all drugs, including
the ones designed to treat life-threatening and severely debilitating ill-
nesses. Despite the unique nature of these conditions, the FDA has not
chosen to compress the time it allows itself to review applications.
In Phase IV testing, or postmarketing surveillance, the FDA has
made some strides for these unique drugs. The FDA has indicated that
it may seek the sponsor's agreement to conduct some postmarketing
studies,191 which could increase information about drug risks and bene-
fits, optimal use dosages, and schedules of administration.1 92 Research-
ers also could derive from these studies information about the drug's
effect in other patient populations or in other stages of the disease or
the effect of long-term drug usage. 9 ' Postmarketing studies are sensi-
ble, and, coupled with simplified initial approval, these studies should
offer superior drug availability with minimum risk to the patient.
Finally, the FDA has suggested that it may conduct focused regula-
tory research on what it deems "critical rate-limiting aspects" of the
preclinical, manufacturing, and clinical phases of drug development and
evaluation. 94 While the FDA's meaning is not completely clear, the fact
that the FDA intends to take an active stance merits note. Instead of
its usual reactive position, the FDA has established a mechanism for
undertaking research on its own initiative.
Thus, while the critics of the procedures for drugs intended to treat
life-threatening and severely debilitating illnesses may not miss the
mark entirely when they argue that current regulations could have ac-
complished everything in these procedures, they overstate the situa-
tion. 95 The FDA has made some real changes in its statutory
framework, and it has moved to expedite certain parts of the approval
process. To sufferers of illnesses awaiting new treatments, however,
these changes may be too little, too late.
190. Id. § 312.84(d).
191. See id. § 312.85.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. § 312.86. These terms are not defined in the new procedures.
195. Critics of the proposal included Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Caif.), who stated, "There is
almost nothing in this proposal that can't be done under current regulations." See Interim Regula-
tions, supra note 154, at 2. Waxman characterized the announcement as "a politically timed an-
nouncement that raises false hopes for desperately ill people." Id. This Note suggests that the new
regulations, although not as far-reaching as they could be, inject needed flexibility into the drug
approval process.
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B. Liability Considerations
Over the last few decades products liability has emerged as an in-
creasingly serious concern for prescription drug manufacturers. 1 6 Mis-
takes in testing or marketing can lead a company to financial ruin.
Ironically, extensive FDA testing has provided one protection for pre-
scription drug manufacturers. 97 If the FDA relaxes testing require-
ments for prescription drugs, the balance between liability and
regulation, which gives tenuous protection from liability, possibly could
shift. Such a shift has serious implications because increased liability
exposure could decrease drug availability and, consequently, defeat the
purpose of the current reforms.
Although the concerns about potentially increased liability for drug
manufacturers have serious underpinnings, they need not cripple at-
tempts to shorten drug approval delays. For one thing, the FDA has
approached the problem by eliminating testing for efficacy, not
safety. 98 Some critics argue that providing accessibility to ineffective
drugs will lead patients to forsake proven treatment alternatives; there-
fore, providing drugs of questionable efficacy has hazards of its own.' 9
The FDA softened its stance on drug efficacy, however, only for drugs
to treat ailments for which no satisfactory alternative treatment ex-
ists.20 0 No promising discussions about allowing all patients the option
of choosing alternative treatments have occurred even though sound
reasons exist for exploring this option.20'
196. For a discussion of some of the reasons for this liability and its impact on the contracep-
tive market, see Orenstein, The Politics of Birth Control, GLAMOUR, Oct. 1990, at 264. This Note
will not attempt to address all of the products liability concerns unique to prescription drug
manufacturing.
197. By explaining FDA requirements and manufacturer efforts to meet those requirements
in minute detail, a drug manufacturer would make a plaintiff's proof of negligence much more
difficult.
198. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The abbreviated approval programs delete
Phase III testing, not Phase I or II testing. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
199. See Annas, supra note 4, at 796-97.
200. See supra notes 38, 162 and accompanying text.
201. See Comment, supra note 26, at 714 (suggesting that the right to privacy supports the
proposition that terminally ill people should have access to unapproved drugs). Chief Justice Bird
of the California Supreme Court in her dissenting opinion in People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697,
711, 591 P.2d 919, 927, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 439 (Bird, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949
(1979), expressed her view that a cancer patient and doctor had a constitutionally protected pri-
vacy right to decide to use Laetrile as a treatment. She wrote:
Cancer is a disease with potentially fatal consequences; this makes the choice of treatment
one of the more important decisions a person may ever make, touching intimately on his or
her being. For this reason, I believe the right to privacy ... prevents the state from interfer-
ing with a person's choice of treatment on the sole grounds that the person has chosen a
treatment which the state considers "ineffective."
Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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Pharmaceutical products liability claims may allege defects in three
different areas: manufacturing, warning, or design.202 Although failure-
to-warn claims traditionally have constituted the majority of prescrip-
tion drug litigation, an increasing number of claims allege design de-
fects. 203 Plaintiffs are unlikely to be able to prosecute successfully
design-defect actions for side effects of a drug marketed solely to treat
untreatable illnesses. The law already provides that if accompanied by
proper warning, unavoidably unsafe products are neither defective nor
unreasonably dangerous.0 4 Unavoidably unsafe products are products
with known risks whose benefits outweigh those risks.2 0 5 Drugs designed
to treat life-threatening illnesses arguably should fall within this classi-
fication.0 6 Consequently, thorough and thoughtful labeling should pro-
vide a significant measure of protection for those who sell drugs not
fully approved by the FDA. 07 Coupled with the tort requirements of
proof of causation and damages, which are frequently difficult to prove
in these circumstances,0 8 liability considerations should not deter drug
development significantly.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States does have one of the most sophisticated and de-
manding prescription drug approval systems in the world partly be-
cause of a discriminating public that places great value on human life.
When Americans take prescription medications, they demand safe and
202. See Schwartz, Products Liability Law and Pharmaceuticals: New Developments and
Divergent Trends, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 33, 34 (1988); see also Birnbaum, Unmasking the
Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33
VAND. L. REv. 593 (1980).
203. Schwartz, supra note 202, at 33.
204. Comment, Drug Products Liability: Duty to Warn, 495 U. Pirr. L. REv. 283, 286 (1987);
see also sources cited infra note 205.
205. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1977); see also Schwartz,
supra note 202, at 36-37.
206. See generally Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARV. L. REV. 773 (1990) [hereinafter Note, A Question of Competence];
Note, Comment K Immunity to Strict Liability: Should All Prescription Drugs Be Protected?, 26
Hous. L. REv. 707 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Comment K Immunity]; Comment, supra note 204.
207. See generally Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation Plans, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 297, 298-
304 (1982) (outlining various statutory responses to compensation for drug injury); McKenna, The
Impact of Product Liability Law on Development of a Vaccine Against the AIDS Virus, 55 U.
CH. L. REV. 943, 963-64 (1988) (rejecting claims that governmental assumption of liability or modi-
fication of liability standards are needed); Note, A Question of Competence, supra note 206, at
785-93 (arguing for FDA preemption of tort claims); Note, Comment K Immunity, supra note 206,
at 737 (suggesting placement of tort burdens on the plaintiff to prove risks of a drug outweigh the
potential benefit to society); Comment, supra note 204, at 299-303 (proposing that the duty to
warn of potential adverse drug reactions should fall on pharmacists and pharmacies).
208. Given that the users of these drugs typically only have a few months to live and cer-
tainly will die absent treatment, the plaintiff will have difficulty proving damages and causation.
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effective medications. The FDA, for the most part, does deliver these
safe medicines, but it does so slowly and at great cost. For many years
society has paid these prices willingly.
In the case of terminal diseases and illnesses that presently have no
acceptable treatments, however, the loss outweighs gains in safety. De-
lay in development, testing, and approval often results in death.
Desperation leads to hucksters, quacks, and black market cures. Thus,
however one defines the question, the most demanding prescription
drug approval regimen in the world is not the answer.
Although very similar to the American system and employing many
of the same safeguards, the British system recognizes drug safety as an
important goal, but not to the exclusion of drug availability.29 To this
end, the British system provides quicker drug approval without exces-
sive new drug toxicity.210 The FDA seems to have noted these advan-
tages and has increased its use of independent committees21' and
recognized that it should use different procedures for experimental use
and treatment use. 12
The FDA also has promulgated special regulations for the approval
of drugs for terminal diseases.21 3 Unfortunately, these regulations sad-
dle excellent ideas with outmoded and burdensome procedures.21 ' They
do establish a good starting point, however, and as interim regulations,
they certainly are an encouraging first step toward a more efficient drug
approval system. These regulations include some of the highlights of
the British system by recognizing the importance of postmarketing sur-
veillance, independent committee involvement, and new drug availabil-
ity. The regulations also eliminate some needless testing, thereby
placing a priority on testing for safety, and not efficacy.
The prescription drug approval process could benefit from more
voluntary interaction and fewer governmental requirements. Better
communication between the FDA, health care providers, researchers,
and pharmaceutical corporations certainly would help promising drugs
reach the market sooner. Presently, regulations burden drug approval
with incessant delays. Also, relaxed licensing requirements in general
coupled with shorter licensing times would offer increased drug
availability.
209. See supra notes 67-86 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
212. See generally supra subpart IV(A)(2).
213. See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
214. The sincerity of the FDA drug reform efforts frequently has been questioned. See The
AIDS Hoax, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1991, at A14, col. 2 (calling the FDA reform efforts a "bureau-
cratic hoax" and a "response to great political pressure" from a "politically astute class of
patients").
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The FDA's response to the peculiar problems attendant to terminal
diseases has flaws. The response, however, does offer a first attempt to
solve these problems and indicates the direction for future FDA re-
forms in drug approval generally. The FDA appears to have recognized
some of the limitations of the current drug approval system. Hopefully,
it will continue to address these limitations to ensure the greatest bene-
fits to patients, medical science, and society as a whole.
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